SIGIR Calls Attention to Issues in U.S. Government Iraq
Reconstruction Efforts
As of July 2008, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq
Reconstruction (SIGIR) and its predecessor – the Coalition
Provisional Authority Inspector General – have issued 122 audits
regarding the implementation and management of nearly every aspect of
the reconstruction effort. SIGIR identified four broad recurring
issues that have been central causes of the deficiencies that have been
found:
• Security: The need to better understand
the problems associated with implementing reconstruction programs in an
unstable security environment.
• Organizational Structure and Processes:
The impact of not having an integrated management structure to provide
clear lines of authority on program coordination and successful delivery
of projects.
• Staffing Concerns: The importance of
anticipating staffing needs and reducing staff turnover.
• Working with Host Governments: Recognition
of how essential working closely with host governments is to the
long-term success of U.S. investments in reconstruction projects.
According to the report, “The United States assumed that
reconstruction would take place in a relatively stable environment with
little threat from insurgents and other groups.”
Ultimately, the report concludes that the U.S. was “not prepared
for the major reconstruction effort that was needed in
Iraq.” As a result of the security challenges posed to
reconstruction, the U.S. has spent over $660 million on failed efforts
to either train Iraqi security forces to protect critical infrastructure
or because construction efforts were sabotaged, and had to reallocate
over $1.78 billion in reconstruction funds to provide for security and
law enforcement programs. Furthermore, the U.S. government has
been unable to perform its quality control functions to the utmost
ability.
However, the 40-page report did outline ways to mitigate future
similar concerns. Among the recommendations are:
• Securing basic infrastructure
• Preparing a comprehensive and independent government
estimate for high-risk construction projects that should be a mandatory
part of the contract file
• Clearly define management roles, responsibilities, etc.
that can withstand an extended duration, if needed, to minimize the
resulting disruption and loss of management continuity
• Take steps that contain high staff turnover to the extent
practical and implement processes to ensure appropriate transfer of
knowledge when turnovers do occur
• Work with host-government officials through construction
and make preparations for transfer to the host government