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SIGIR Calls Attention to Issues in U.S. Government Iraq Reconstruction Efforts

As of July 2008, the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) and its predecessor – the Coalition Provisional Authority Inspector General – have issued 122 audits regarding the implementation and management of nearly every aspect of the reconstruction effort.  SIGIR identified four broad recurring issues that have been central causes of the deficiencies that have been found:

• Security: The need to better understand the problems associated with implementing reconstruction programs in an unstable security environment.
• Organizational Structure and Processes: The impact of not having an integrated management structure to provide clear lines of authority on program coordination and successful delivery of projects.
• Staffing Concerns: The importance of anticipating staffing needs and reducing staff turnover.
• Working with Host Governments: Recognition of how essential working closely with host governments is to the long-term success of U.S. investments in reconstruction projects.

According to the report, “The United States assumed that reconstruction would take place in a relatively stable environment with little threat from insurgents and other groups.”  Ultimately, the report concludes that the U.S. was “not prepared for the major reconstruction effort that was needed in Iraq.”  As a result of the security challenges posed to reconstruction, the U.S. has spent over $660 million on failed efforts to either train Iraqi security forces to protect critical infrastructure or because construction efforts were sabotaged, and had to reallocate over $1.78 billion in reconstruction funds to provide for security and law enforcement programs.  Furthermore, the U.S. government has been unable to perform its quality control functions to the utmost ability. 

However, the 40-page report did outline ways to mitigate future similar concerns.  Among the recommendations are:

• Securing basic infrastructure
• Preparing a comprehensive and independent government estimate for high-risk construction projects that should be a mandatory part of the contract file
• Clearly define management roles, responsibilities, etc. that can withstand an extended duration, if needed, to minimize the resulting disruption and loss of management continuity
• Take steps that contain high staff turnover to the extent practical and implement processes to ensure appropriate transfer of knowledge when turnovers do occur
• Work with host-government officials through construction and make preparations for transfer to the host government

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